
HOW FREE IS FREE MOVEMENT?

DYNAMICS AND DRIVERS OF MOBILITY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION



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By Meghan Benton and Milica Petrovic
Migration Policy Institute Europe

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Free movement is at the heart of the European project. The right to work, study, live, and retire in another European Union (EU) Member State provides numerous social, cultural, and economic benefits for EU countries and citizens—from more efficient labour markets to increased cultural exchanges and educational opportunities. Yet the merits and impacts of intra-EU mobility continue to be debated especially since the last set of ‘transitional arrangements’—restrictions countries could place on workers from the newer Member States—are soon to expire. Meanwhile, scars left by the economic crisis leave commentators questioning how obstacles to free movement could be lifted to enable Europe’s labour markets to function more smoothly.

Although the large-scale movements from east to west have dominated both the public rhetoric and academic research on intra-EU mobility, these movements are only a small slice of a longstanding, multidimensional phenomenon—and one that is continually evolving.

To date, free movement has seen three main eras:

- The period prior to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements where most movements were small-scale and regional (such as between countries that had historical ties and bilateral agreements).
- Following the 2004 enlargement when large (and in some cases unexpected) numbers of eastern Europeans moved from east to west, especially to countries that chose not to restrict access to their labour markets.
- The period since the economic crisis where an initial decline in east-west labour mobility was followed by a boost—although a modest one, according to some analysts—in movements of workers from the crisis-hit countries of the south to the more prosperous north.

Immigration is largely driven by opportunity differentials. But free movement affords EU citizens the chance to move for education, lifestyle, or love—with few of the hurdles mobility generates elsewhere. While most EU citizens still say they move for work, a sizeable share moves for family; this is especially the case for women and citizens of the longest-standing EU Member States, for whom economic imperatives might be less strong. Small distances, reciprocal tuition fee and financing arrangements, and exchange programs have encouraged more EU citizens to take advantage of the right to move for study. And the ease of moving back and forth between countries has contributed to the burgeoning phenomenon of retirement migration.

The European Union provides the closest thing to a ‘laboratory’ on open borders,¹ allowing us to examine how reducing barriers to mobility might play out under conditions of economic stability (between, as well as within, countries), large opportunity differentials between countries, and economic strife. Yet many of the results remain to be seen. The current knowledge base on the economic and social impacts of free movement is slim—in part because the flexible, multifarious forms intra-EU mobility take obscures it from official data sources.

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While the economic impact of EU migration has been broadly positive, there are some indications that it may have negatively affected the earnings of low-skilled workers, although other studies suggest that EU migration has had fewer negative effects than other transnational migration. Similarly, it looks likely that most EU citizens are net contributors to the public purse, but EU mobility may lead to some perverse consequences (e.g. authorities can face difficulties planning for demographic changes, circular migration can enable fraudulent use of public health systems, and sometimes mobility is associated with inefficient use of public services). Finally, social impacts are very difficult to measure because it is difficult to disaggregate EU migration from other forms of migration. Communities suffer when the pace of change puts pressures on local infrastructure, but many of the problems faced by mobile EU citizens following the recession were shared by other groups.

¹ Saara Koikkalainen, ‘Free Movement in Europe: Past and Present,’ *Migration Information Source*, April 2011, www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=836.

I. INTRODUCTION

The right to move and live freely within the European Economic Area (EEA) is one of the foundational principles of the European Union. The movement of people for work, study, family purposes, and retirement can yield a variety of benefits to the citizens and countries of Europe. These include more efficient labour markets, increased cultural exchanges, better-trained workers, and the opportunity for citizens to broaden their horizons.

Intra-EU labour mobility has also been presented as one potential response to the Eurozone crisis.² Employment opportunities are unevenly distributed across the continent; labour mobility offers a mechanism to reduce these disparities, especially within a single-currency zone where exchange-rate adjustments cannot be used to reduce economic imbalances among countries. The question of how and to what extent flows have responded to shifting labour market conditions is therefore a pertinent one. At the same time, recent political and economic tensions—particularly the prolonged jobs crisis throughout much of Europe—have placed intra-EU mobility under increased scrutiny.³

While the lion's share of research on free movement in the past decade has focused on east-to-west movement—because of its (in some cases unexpected) scale and debates over its socioeconomic impact—intra-EU mobility is much more complex. Some of the most significant flows are actually among EU-15 countries, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany.⁴ In addition, the question of how countries can best manage their Roma populations—and protect the fundamental rights of this marginalised group—has gained political and academic prominence in the past few years.⁵

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 can yield a variety of benefits to the citizens and countries of Europe.*

This report examines the phenomenon of free movement within the European Union, exploring why people migrate, where they choose to go, what factors have affected these movements over time, and the characteristics of those moving. It first examines trends in intra-EU mobility; the next section turns to the question of why people move; and the final section describes what has been done to assess the social and economic impact of free movement of all kinds. The report concludes by identifying some avenues for further research.

2 In particular, see European Commission Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities (DG Employment), *EU Employment and Social Situation Quarterly Review* (Brussels: DG Employment, 2012), <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7830&langId=en>; Thieß Peterson, *Can Mobility Offset Employment? Spotlight Europe* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012); DB Research, *Labour Mobility in the Euro Area* (Frankfurt: Deutsche Bank AG, 2011), www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD000000000278645.PDF.

3 For example Prime Minister David Cameron has suggested the United Kingdom might try to block the migration of Greeks if Greece was forced to leave the Eurozone. Nicholas Watt, "David Cameron 'Prepared to Halt Immigration of Greeks into UK,'" *The Guardian*, July 3, 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jul/03/david-cameron-immigration-greece-uk.

4 Following common practice, this report uses the term EU-27 to refer to the current European Union, EU-15 to refer to the so-called 'old' or pre-enlargement European Union (Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, France, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom, Austria, Finland, Sweden); EU-8 to refer to the first round of eastern enlargement (Poland, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary); EU-2 to refer to the second round of eastern enlargement (Romania and Bulgaria); and EU-12 to refer to all of the most recent Member States (i.e., the EU-8 plus Cyprus, Malta, Bulgaria, and Romania; although Cyprus and Malta were part of the 2004 enlargement, they are not commonly grouped with the EU-8).

5 DG Employment, *The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union* (Brussels: DG Employment, 2004); and Claude Cahn and Elspeth Guild, *Recent Migration of Roma in Europe* (Vienna: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE] High Commissioner on National Minorities, 2009), www.euromanet.eu/upload/21/82/Recent_Migration_of_Roma_in_Europe_April_2009.CoE-OSCE.pdf.

II. TRENDS IN INTRA-EU MOBILITY

Despite the relative ease with which EU nationals can live and work in other Member States, intra-EU movement is relatively small compared to other forms of migration. While 4.1 percent of EU residents are from outside the European Union (‘third-country nationals’), only 2.5 percent are EU nationals living in another Member State (see Table 1). Most foreign nationals reside in the ‘old’ European Union, the so-called EU-15.

Table 1. Population of Foreign, Mobile European Union, and Third-Country Nationals in the EU-15 (thousands), 2011

Country	Foreign Nationals		Mobile EU Nationals		Third-Country Nationals		Total Population
	Population	% of total	Population	% of total	Population	% of total	
Germany	7,199	8.8%	2,628	3.2%	4,571	5.6%	81,752
Spain	5,655	12.3%	2,329	5.0%	3,326	7.2%	46,153
United Kingdom	4,487	7.2%	2,061	3.3%	2,426	3.9%	62,499
France	3,825	5.9%	1,340	2.1%	2,485	3.8%	65,048
Italy	4,570	7.5%	1,335	2.2%	3,235	5.3%	60,626
Belgium	1,163	10.6%	749	6.8%	414	3.8%	11,001
Austria	907	10.8%	352	4.2%	555	6.6%	8,396
Netherlands	673	4.0%	335	2.0%	338	2.0%	16,656
Ireland	362	8.1%	292	6.5%	70	1.6%	4,481
Sweden	622	6.6%	270	2.9%	352	3.7%	9,416
Luxembourg	221	43.2%	191	37.3%	30	5.9%	512
Greece	956	8.5%	153	1.4%	803	7.1%	11,310
Denmark	346	6.2%	125	2.2%	221	4.0%	5,561
Portugal	448	4.2%	103	1.0%	345	3.2%	10,637
Finland	167	3.1%	61	1.1%	106	2.0%	5,375
EU-15	31,600	7.9%	12,325	3.1%	19,275	4.8%	399,422
EU-27	33,306	6.6%	12,805	2.5%	20,501	4.1%	502,510

Source: Eurostat, ‘Population by sex, age group and citizenship,’ http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_pop1ctz&lang=en. Total numbers for the EU-27 (current European Union) are provided as a comparison.

European citizens represent a minority of total migrants across the region, comprising 38 percent of the total migrant population in EU countries, and a minority of migrants in most countries of Europe (notable exceptions are Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Cyprus).

Although there are lower shares of EU nationals than third-country nationals at any given point in time, a snapshot is likely to underestimate the true extent of intra-EU mobility. In fact, 10 percent of EU citizens report having worked in another Member State at some point in their lives.⁶ Because EU nationals have greater flexibility (as they benefit from free movement rules), and often have a shorter distance to travel than those from outside the European Union, many of those who take advantage of free movement do not stay long in their destinations. The largest numbers of mobile EU citizens live in Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy (see Figure 1). These five countries have 80 percent of the adult population of mobile EU citizens of working age in all 26 countries (other than Romania) for which data are available. Of course, these countries are large; relative to their population the figures are less striking. For example, Germany’s EU population comprises a smaller proportion of EU nationals than neighbouring Austria (3.2 percent versus 4.2 percent, respectively). These five countries also have high volumes of immigration in general:

6 European Commission Directorate-General for Communication (DG Communication), *Eurobarometer on the Internal Market: Awareness Perceptions and Impact* (Brussels: European Commission Directorate-General for Communication, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_363_en.pdf.

Box I. Data Limitations

There are limits to how accurately the movements of people within the European Union can be measured. First, demographic tools such as national censuses are better equipped to measure static population sizes ('stocks') rather than capture dynamic movement between countries ('flows').


Second, because EU citizens can cross borders and stay in other Member States for a short period without registering with the local authorities, both stocks and flows data may underestimate the true extent of intra-EU mobility. In particular, cross-border commuting and short-term migration for study or seasonal work are likely to be missing from the data. At the same time, few countries have ways of accurately accounting for departing migrants (who have either returned to their country of origin or moved to a new destination), hence potentially overestimating mobile populations.

Finally, countries collect different types of data and may define migrants differently. For example, some measure the number of foreign nationals while others count the foreign born, which would include naturalised citizens. Therefore, the data collected are not always directly comparable across countries.

each of the five has even higher numbers of third-country nationals than EU citizens.

Four of these five countries account for 75 percent of the adult population of mobile EU citizens from new Member States, too. Italy is home to 21 percent of EU-12 nationals for whom data are available; Spain to 21 percent; the United Kingdom to 18 percent; and Germany to 16 percent.⁷ France provides comparable data on its EU-27 but not its EU-15 or EU-12 populations (thus, French data on the EU-27 but not the other two groupings are represented in Figure 1). France does, however, gather information on EU-12 nationals ages 15-64, through the Labour Force Survey (LFS). LFS results indicate that France hosted only 3 percent of the working-age, mobile EU-12 nationals in

Figure 1. Population of Mobile EU Citizens in Member States, 2011



Note: Figures for Romania are missing and so are excluded completely. Figures for the EU-15 (used to calculate the EU-12) are missing for Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and France, for which EU-27 figures are presented.

Source: Eurostat, 'Population by sex, age group and citizenship.'

⁷ Note that this calculation is made on the basis of an incomplete total, because no details on the EU-12 population are provided by Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, or France. As these countries are low receivers of nationals from new Member States, this data discrepancy is unlikely to considerably affect the proportions cited here, but these numbers should be taken as illustrative.

the European Union in 2011, or 117,000 workers (compared to 1 million in Italy, 942,000 in the United Kingdom, 832,000 in Spain, and 667,000 in Germany).⁸ A possible explanation for this is that France applied ‘transitional provisions’ (restrictions on the free movement of EU-8 workers) until 2008, which was relatively late compared to other major EU destinations.⁹ It also has a relatively rigid labour market, thus dampening demand for labour migration. In addition, France’s deportations of Roma communities to Bulgaria and Romania may have made it appear a hostile destination to Eastern Europeans.

Some of the major destination countries attract large numbers of mobile EU citizens from a single country of origin. For example over three-quarters of Romanian citizens living in another European country are in either Italy or Spain, over two-thirds of Polish nationals live in the United Kingdom or Germany, and half of Portuguese citizens live in France.¹⁰ This is thought to be because of the role of networks and ‘chain migration’. Once migrant communities are established in certain regions, they become somewhat self-perpetuating. Settled migrants provide new workers with employment contacts and housing, and migrants from particular towns and regions often follow others to particular cities or neighbourhoods.

A. *Intra-EU Mobility Before and After Enlargement*

Box 2. The Free Movement of Roma

The Roma constitute Europe’s largest minority (estimated at 10-12 million people); most reside in Europe’s newest Member States. This population is highly marginalised: the Roma face regular discrimination and are likely to have low socioeconomic status. A 2012 survey conducted by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency found that 90 percent of Roma live below the poverty line. In addition, one in three is unemployed.

The 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements greatly increased the population of Roma eligible for free movement and residence within the European Union, prompting some countries to raise concerns about whether new flows of Roma would become burdens on their social support systems—or even threaten public security. (There are no official data on the number who have moved as intra-EU migration is not disaggregated by ethnicity.)

While a host of strategies for Roma inclusion have been developed at the EU and Member State levels, fundamental rights violations persist. Some research suggests that Roma EU citizens may face even more discrimination in other Member States than in their countries of origin. At the same time, public support for free movement in general has in some countries been weakened by high-profile controversies involving Roma. The experience of Europe’s most vulnerable mobile citizens can thus provide a useful test case for the limitations of the right to free movement.

The free movement of European workers has a long history. It has been enshrined in EU law since 1968. Regional mobility between Germany and Austria; Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and France; and the United Kingdom and Ireland has been growing steadily over the last few decades. However, this phenomenon has taken on particular characteristics during three main periods: before the accession of the new Member States in Eastern Europe (‘pre-enlargement’), immediately following this period (‘post-enlargement’), and during the economic crisis.

Regional mobility and seasonal migration were small scale before the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the European Union. Prior to 2004, the main destination countries for seasonal work were Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Cross-border mobility among Eastern European countries—including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states—and Germany was well established. For example, in 2003 Germany had 317,600 Polish, 28,500 Czech, and 56,000 Hungarian residents.¹¹ Germany had the highest population of citizens from what


8 Eurostat, ‘Population by sex, age, nationality and labour status,’ http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_pganws&lang=en.

9 The United Kingdom did not impose transitional arrangements; Italy and Spain removed theirs in 2008; and Germany lifted restrictions in 2011.

10 Eurostat, ‘Nearly Two-Thirds of the Foreigners Living in EU Member States are Citizens of Countries outside the EU-27,’ Statistics in Focus, July 2012, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-12-031/EN/KS-SF-12-031-EN.PDF.

11 A large portion of regional movement between Germany and Eastern Europe was ‘return’ migration of ethnic Germans living in Poland or Romania. As these migrants had German nationality, they do not show up as foreign nationals in German or European population statistics, but these movements played an important role in establishing networks of people with connections in Eastern Europe.

Figure 2. Population of Mobile EU Citizens in Member States, 2011



Note: Figures for Romania are missing and so are excluded completely. Figures for the EU-15 (used to calculate the EU-12) are missing for Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and France, for which EU-27 figures are presented.
Source: Eurostat, 'Population by sex, age group and citizenship.'

would become the EU-27, with nearly 2.5 million in 2003. The second-highest receiver of citizens of the future EU-27 was France, with 1.25 million, followed by the United Kingdom, with just over 1 million (see Figure 2).

Between 2004 and 2008, the number of citizens of new Member States living in the EU-15 increased by more than 1 million.¹² Two mobility corridors developed in particular: Polish and Baltic flows to the United Kingdom and Ireland, and Romanian and Bulgarian flows to Spain and Italy.¹³

The significant flows to the United Kingdom and Ireland were largely unanticipated. Prior to the 2004 enlargement, the UK government had hugely underestimated the numbers of inflows, predicting only between 5,000 and 13,000 a year.¹⁴ At the peak in 2007, the United Kingdom received 100,000 nationals of new Member States, though immigration from Eastern Europe fell markedly by 2008, especially from Poland, before resuming to some extent in 2010 (see Figure 3).

Intra-EU labour migration was to a large degree shaped by the work restrictions imposed on new Member States.¹⁵ The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden decided not to impose restrictions on EU citizens from countries that joined during the 2004 enlargement. Sweden received a low intake while the United Kingdom and Ireland had an unpredictably large influx due in part to favourable labour market conditions and, some have argued, language familiarity.¹⁶

By contrast, Austria and Germany were the last countries in 2011 to remove restrictions for citizens from the 2004 enlargement countries, but still experienced a modest increase in their EU populations in the post-enlargement years.¹⁷ This is likely to have occurred because of Germany's already significant population of Polish workers, along with its geographic location, historical links, and bilateral agreements with Poland. In addition it actively

¹² DG Employment, *Employment in Europe 2008* (Brussels: DG Employment 2008), <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=119&langId=en>.

¹³ DG Employment, *Mobility in Europe 2011* (Brussels: DG Employment 2011), www.mobilitypartnership.eu/Documents/Mobility%20in%20Europe%202011.pdf.


¹⁴ Christian Dustmann, Maria Casanova, Michael Fertig, Ian Preston, and Christoph M Schmidt, *The Impact of EU Enlargement on Migration Flows* (London: Home Office, 2003), <http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/14332/1/14332.pdf>.

¹⁵ EU Member States may elect to impose restrictions on the free movement of workers from new Member States for a transitional period of up to seven years after these states join the European Union. At current writing these 'transitional arrangements' apply only to workers from Romania and Bulgaria, who became Members on January 1, 2007, and are applied in some form in nine EU Member States (see DG Employment, 'Bulgaria and Romania,' <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=508&langId=en>).

¹⁶ Andrew Watt, Béla Galgóczi, and Janine Leschke, 'Intra-EU Labour Migration: Flows, Effects and Policy Responses' (working paper 2009.03, updated spring 2011, European Trade Union Institute, Brussels, 2011), www.etui.org/content/download/1955/22135/file/11+WP+2009+03+Update+WEB.pdf.

¹⁷ DG Employment, *Employment in Europe 2008*.

Figure 3. Inflows of EU-12 Nationals to the United Kingdom (thousands), 2004-10



Source: UK Office for National Statistics, 'UK International Passenger Survey,' www.ons.gov.uk/ons/datasets-and-tables/index.html.

encouraged immigration from the east through special and seasonal worker programs, despite formally imposing transitional arrangements. Eastern European migrant networks also existed in Austria due to that nation's central location in the region; Austria remained an attractive destination throughout the 2000s due to a favourable labour market.¹⁸

Despite their very different histories, clear similarities in their EU-12 populations now exist between the United Kingdom and Germany on the one hand, and Austria and Ireland on the other. Austria and Ireland have small numbers but among the highest populations of EU-12 nationals relative to their population. The United Kingdom and Germany both have high overall numbers, but a small share relative to their population (see Figure 4).

The free movement of European workers has a long history.


Remaining restrictions for EU-8 countries were removed in May 2011, although they remain in place for Bulgarian and Romanian (EU-2) nationals in nine Member States. Preliminary data suggest that the number of EU-8 nationals in Germany, which lifted its transitional arrangements in May 2011, clearly increased. The number of EU-8 nationals employed or self-employed, for example, grew from 227,000 to 331,000 between April 2011 and April 2012, an increase of 46 percent.¹⁹ A recent government report suggests that these figures may reflect an increase in formal registrations following the lifting of restrictions, as well as new flows.²⁰

18 Watt, Galgóczi, and Leschke, 'Intra-EU Labour Migration.'

19 Bundesagentur für Arbeit, *Auswirkungen der uneingeschränkten Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit ab dem 1. Mai auf den Arbeitsmarkt* (Bundesagentur für Arbeit: Nürnberg, 2012), <http://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Statischer-Content/Statistische-Analysen/Statistische-Sonderberichte/Generische-Publikationen/Bilanz-der-Auswirkungen-der-uneingeschraenkten-Arbeitnehmerfreizuegigkeit-auf-den-Arbeitsmarkt-nach-einem-Jahr.pdf>. April 2012 figures are preliminary.

20 DG Employment, *Mobility in Europe 2011*.

Figure 4. EU-12 Population Stocks in the European Union, 2011



Source: Eurostat, 'Population by sex, age group and citizenship.'


B. Intra-EU Mobility and the Economic Crisis

Intra-EU mobility has seen significant changes since the onset of the economic crisis. While it is difficult to draw a direct line of causation, a few observations are worth noting. First, east-to-west mobility has decreased. The United Kingdom in particular saw a significant drop in flows from EU-12 countries from 2007 onwards, especially in comparison to other migration flows according to data from national insurance number allocations (see Figure 5).²¹ Because the post-enlargement EU-12 migration was driven largely by labour demand, these flows appear to have been especially responsive to changing economic conditions.²²

21 Since national insurance (NI) number allocations are not based on a sample, they are a more reliable measure of labour migration than the alternative, the UK International Passenger Survey (IPS). The IPS also only records inflows of migrants who plan to stay more than 12 months (adjustments to capture visitors who stay are thought to be imperfect).

22 For a more extensive discussion of this, see Will Somerville and Madeleine Sumption, *Immigration in the UK: The Recession and Beyond* (London: Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2009), www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Immigration-in-the-UK-The-Recession-and-Beyond.pdf.


Figure 5. National Insurance Number Allocations in the United Kingdom, 2005-11



Source: UK Office for National Statistics, 'UK International Passenger Survey,' www.ons.gov.uk/ons/datasets-and-tables/index.html.

But while new inflows of EU-12 nationals have tapered off, the EU-12 population continues to grow. In the EU-15 as a whole, the working-age EU-12 population rose from 2.8 million in 2007 to 4.2 million in 2011 (see Figure 6). In the same period, in the United Kingdom, the working-age EU-12 population rose from 575,000 to 942,000. It therefore appears that many workers chose to weather the economic crisis and remain abroad. Explanations for this include the proliferation and strength of family ties and social networks (which act as safety nets during economic downturns), the perception that opportunities were no better elsewhere, the expectation that things would get better, and eligibility for unemployment and social benefits.

Figure 6. Working-Age Foreign Population in the EU-15, 2005-11



Source: Eurostat, 'Population by sex, age, nationality and labour status,' http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_pganws&lang=en.


A second observation is that emigration has increased from several of the countries worst hit by the crisis. The largest increases have been from Greece and Spain. Greece saw an increase in outflows of EU nationals (both natives and mobile EU citizens) of 207 percent (from 22,402 to 68,874) between 2008 and 2010.²³ In the same period, EU emigration from Spain increased from 70,538 to 119,579, or by 70 percent (see Figure 7). By way of a comparison, Germany saw emigration of EU nationals drop by 321,136 or 64 percent in the same two years.²⁴

It should be noted that a boost in flows of EU citizens from these crisis-hit countries does not necessarily mean that

²³ Data on outflows of Greek nationals alone are not available.

²⁴ Eurostat, 'Emigration by sex, age group and citizenship,' http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_emi1ctz&lang=en.

Figure 7. Emigration of EU Citizens from Countries Most Affected by the Crisis, 2005-10



Note: Data for Ireland, Greece and Portugal are only available from 2008 onwards.

Source: Eurostat, 'Emigration by sex, age group and citizenship.'

http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_emi1ctz&lang=en.

their emigration to other countries of Europe has increased. EU citizens may instead be moving to destinations outside the European Union. But there are three further indicators that the crisis has contributed to increased intra-EU mobility in particular: evidence of higher numbers of citizens of southern countries living in other EU Member States, major destinations of outflows from Spain, and sending countries of inflows to Germany.

First, the numbers of recently arrived Spanish, Greek, Italian, and Irish citizens resident in other Member States increased between 2008 and 2011, suggesting that the crisis has led to an increase in emigration to other European countries. By contrast, the number of newly arrived Romanian and Polish mobile EU citizens decreased in this period (see Table 2).


Table 2. Recent Arrivals of (Economically Active) EU Citizens in Other EU Countries (thousands), 2008-11

Nationality	2008	2011	Change (%)
Greek	14.3	17.8	24.5
Irish	21.5	24.6	14.4
Spanish	28.8	30.8	6.9
Italian	66.2	68.2	3
Portuguese	52.4	35.6	-32.1
Romanian	263	168.3	-36
Polish	444.6	168.8	-62

Source: DG Employment, *EU Employment and Social Situation Quarterly Review* (Brussels: DG Employment, 2012), <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7830&langId=en>.

Second, Spanish government statistics (which break down emigration flows by country of destination) also suggest that some outflows are headed to Europe. However, the European Union is still a minority destination, accounting for 47 percent of Spanish-born emigration—with 10 percent going to the United Kingdom, 8 percent going to France, and only 6 percent going to Germany (see Figure 8).


Figure 8. Top Destinations for Native-Born Emigrants from Spain, 2011



Source: MPI Europe analysis of Instituto Nacional de Estadística data provided upon request, 2012.

Finally, a picture of emigration can be constructed using data from *destination* countries. Recent figures from Germany show that it is experiencing a boost in workers from crisis-hit southern Europe and from Eastern Europe. The data show a 52 percent increase in immigration from Spain between 2010 and 2011, and a 90 percent increase in flows from Greece during this period. This is equivalent to only 7,000 and 11,250 additional migrants, respectively, since the baseline was low. In the same period, inflows to Germany from Poland increased by 42 percent or 48,686, the likely result of the end of transitional arrangements. Bulgarian and Romanian inflows are also on the rise, possibly in anticipation of transitional arrangements that are due to end in 2014 and because Germany no longer requires a work permit for seasonal workers from these countries (see Figure 9). It is also likely that migration flows are being diverted from the crisis-hit countries of southern Europe to Germany.²⁵

Figure 9. Immigration to Germany from Significant Source Countries by Year, 1996-2011



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Bevoelkerung und Erwerbstaetigkeit: Vorläufige Wanderungsergebnisse 2011* (Wiesbaden, Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012), www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/Wanderungen/vorlaeufigeWanderungen5127101117005.html.

25 Simone Bertoli, Herbert Brücker, and Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 'The European Crisis and Migration to Germany: Expectations and the Diversion of Migration Flows' (IZA Discussion Paper 7170, January 2013), <http://ftp.iza.org/dp7170.pdf>.

Other destination countries also are beginning to see similar trends. Gross immigration from the European Union to the Netherlands increased from 41,476 to 64,755 between 2007 and 2011, equivalent to a 37 percent rise. In the same period, inflows to the Netherlands from Spain increased by 112 percent (equivalent to 444 percent in net immigration), but in raw numbers the figures are small (3,205 in 2011—up from 1,509 in 2007). Inflows from Poland also increased by 86 percent between 2007 and 2011. Just in the last year for which statistics are available (2010-11), immigration to the Netherlands from Poland went up by 27 percent, equivalent to over 4,000 people.²⁶ This might be accounted for by a diversion of migration flows from other EU destination countries that are not faring as well.

In Norway (not a Member State but a member of the EEA region for free movement), inflows from the European Union went up by 22 percent between 2007 and 2010, from 39,053 to 47,442. However, arrivals from Spain made up only a small number (1,411 people in 2010), and no data are available for Greece or Portugal.²⁷

III. REASONS FOR MIGRATION

Opportunity differentials are at the heart of most migration.²⁸ Individuals weigh the potential gains (such as increased earnings, chances of getting a job, or career development opportunities for themselves and their family) against the likely social and other relevant costs. The questions of whether to migrate and where to migrate are also affected by external factors—chief among them being the ease of intra-EU mobility (no visa requirements or work permits, few bureaucratic hurdles, relatively short geographical distances, and the low costs associated with changing course to pursue other, more promising, opportunities). Because the barriers are lower, people are more inclined to take risks and to make choices based on more diverse reasons.

Some people are more likely to move than others. Being young, better educated, male, and living in a city are attributes associated with mobility. Various factors may make it more difficult to move, like having children, being a member of a dual-earner household (thus having to make decisions based on two careers), and owning a house.²⁹ Other obstacles include difficulties in transferring pension benefits, whether there are adequate mechanisms in the destination country for recognising one's credentials, and, according to one study, the risks that foreign experience will not be recognised upon returning home.³⁰ In public opinion surveys, language and family ties are routinely cited as the main barriers to mobility.³¹

Opportunity differentials are at the heart of most migration.

Choice of destination is also influenced by a variety of social and economic factors. Better economic opportunities, including large wage differentials, low unemployment, and considerable labour demand, explain the significant flows from Eastern Europe to the United Kingdom and Ireland following the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements.³² Existing migrant networks explain why Romanian nationals have mainly settled in Spain and Italy. And the low

26 Statline Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, "Statline," <http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/?LA=en>. Note that figures are for country of birth, not country of citizenship.

27 Government No., "Immigration," www.regieringen.no/en/dep/jd/Subjects/immigration.html?id=1134.

28 Demetrios G. Papademetriou, 'Migration Meets Slow Growth,' *Finance and Development* 49 no. 3 (2012): 18-22, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/09/pdf/papademe.pdf.

29 Holger Bonin et al., 'Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising its Economic and Social Benefits' (IZA Research Report 19, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, July 2008), www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/reports/report_pdfs/iza_report_19.pdf; and Anzelika Zaiceva and Klaus F Zimmermann, 'Scale, Diversity, and Determinants of Labour Migration in Europe,' *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 24, no. 3 (2008): 427-51.

30 A study of the Dutch labour force, for example, found that workers perceive low returns from intra-EU mobility, because foreign experience is believed to be unattractive by Dutch employers. Hendrik P. Van Dalen and Kene Henkens, 'Invisible Barriers in International Labour Migration: The Case of the Netherlands' (working paper 2009-16, CentER, Tilburg University, March 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1365120. Several studies have pointed to the problem of transferring benefits across borders, including Bonin et al., *Geographic Mobility in the European Union*.

31 For example, DG Communication, *Eurobarometer on the Internal Market*.

32 Surveys of EU-12 migrants in the United Kingdom find that their primary reasons for migrating are economic. For a summary, see Anne E. Green, *Impact of Economic Downturn and Migration* (London: Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011), www.researchonline.org.uk/sds/search/download.do.jsessionid=E5A223555FBF6E438DDBA33F72C723DC?ref=B19458.

familiarity with Scandinavian languages is one reason why immigration to these countries has been relatively small in scale, despite their generous welfare systems and (until recently) comparatively positive economic outlook.


A. Employment

While there are, clearly, complex factors at play in any decision to migrate, the primary reason given by most mobile EU citizens is work; however, there are variations across countries and across different groups. The proportion of EU citizens identifying work as the reason for living in another EU country in 2008 ranged from 57 percent in Italy to 24 percent in the Netherlands (see Figure 10).

Mobile EU citizens in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Ireland were most likely to have moved without a job already set up, while those in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands were the most likely to have planned employment.

A higher proportion of EU-12 nationals than EU-15 nationals cited work as the reason for a past move in 2007 (59 percent and 41 percent respectively), presumably because movements within western Europe were less financially compelling.³³

Figure 10. Share of Mobile EU Citizens of Working Age Who Cited Work as Main Reason for Moving, 2008



Note: Data are available only for selected countries.

Source: Eurostat, 'Percentage distribution of main reason for migration, by country of birth, sex and age,' http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfso_08cobr&lang=en.

B. Family


Family—accompanying family, family reunification, and family formation—is the second most important cause of intra-EU movements. But again, data from the Labour Force Survey show differences among European countries, more or less a reverse of the trends for work-related migration. The proportion of EU citizens identifying family as their main reason for living in another EU country in 2008 ranged from 50 percent in the Netherlands to 17 percent in the United Kingdom.

Women are much more likely to move for family reasons (Figure 11). Over 60 percent of female EU nationals in Norway, the Netherlands, and Portugal gave family as their primary reason for moving, and over 30 percent in all countries other than the United Kingdom (where 27 percent of women said family). In Norway, over 50 percent of men

33 Bonin et al., 'Geographic Mobility in the European Union.'

cited family as the main reason for migrating; in all other countries the figure was 35 percent or less.

Figure 11. Share of Mobile EU Citizens of Working Age Who Cited Family as Main Reason for Moving, 2008



Note: Data are only available for selected countries.

Source: Eurostat, Percentage distribution of main reason for migration, by country of birth, sex and age.

C. Study

With between 2 and 16 percent of EU citizens (Spain and the United Kingdom respectively) citing study as their reason for moving, education is not as significant an impetus for moving as work or family.³⁴ But educational movements are on the increase, with a host of opportunities for study abroad such as the Erasmus and Socrates study exchange programmes, language courses, and internships.

Overall, the United Kingdom is the largest destination for study in Europe, but sources vary enormously. For example 96 percent of mobile Irish students are in the United Kingdom, and 44 percent of German students are in the Netherlands. Some east-west and south-north corridors can be observed, such as Bulgaria to Germany and Greece to the United Kingdom (see Table 3).

The United States continues to be the main competitor for mobile EU students. But it appears to be a more prominent destination for mobile doctoral researchers than for other types of students. In 2009, 58,000 EU students (at all levels) were in the United States in order to study, compared with 117,000 in the United Kingdom and 55,220 in Germany.³⁵ While comprehensive data are not available for doctoral students alone, a recent study found that over half of mobile European PhD students studied in the United States, a significant finding given concerns about a brain drain of European researchers to North America.³⁶

According to surveys of students, educational quality and the availability of programmes in English are significant pull factors, as is funding.³⁷ For doctoral students, research opportunities (in particular the absence of them in home countries and the quality of them in destination countries) are key determinants of mobility.³⁸

³⁴ No data were provided for Germany, France, Luxembourg, or Portugal.

³⁵ Eurostat, 'Students from abroad by level of education and sex,' http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=educ_momo_gen&lang=en. Data are not directly comparable with those provided in the table as they relate to mobile students only (that is, those who have moved solely for the purpose of study). Comparable data are not available.

³⁶ Linda Van Bouwel, Elissavet Lykogianni, and Reinhilde Veugelers, *Mobility Decisions of European Doctoral Researchers* (Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit, 2012), https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/329308/1/MSI_1120.pdf.

³⁷ Laura Thissen and Sijf Ederveen, 'Higher Education: Time for Coordination on European Level?' (discussion paper No. 68, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, July 2006), www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/higher-education-time-coordination-european-level.pdf.

³⁸ Van Bouwel, Lykogianni, and Veugelers, *Mobility Decisions of European Doctoral Researchers*.

Table 3. International Students by Country of Origin and Receiving Country, 2009

Country of Origin	UK	Germany	France	Austria	NL	Other	Total
Germany	18,912	n/a	6,774	20,704	19,177	7,881	73,448
France	16,817	6,406	n/a	522	867	21,338	45,950
Poland	17,630	13,214	3,008	1,640	848	3,657	39,997
Italy	10,450	8,110	5,348	6,811	702	7,893	39,314
Greece	13,949	5,771	1,868	316	744	5,482	28,130
Romania	3,266	3,733	3,950	1,079	488	11,357	23,873
Ireland	22,152	394	389	69	149	392	23,545
Spain	8,400	4,929	3,908	520	843	2,632	21,232
Bulgaria	3,356	9,593	2,188	1,216	1,029	2,468	19,850
Portugal	6,081	1,693	2,781	132	322	4,601	15,610
Netherlands	5,577	1,593	673	227	n/a	5,546	13,616
Austria	1,918	7,450	433	n/a	258	690	10,749
Other	18,365	13,127	9,442	4,943	4,021	14,579	64,477
Total	165,238	89,140	50,204	43,122	33,469	103,095	484,268

Notes: This includes foreign students from outside the European Union, and those who did not move for the purpose of study. The data collected by Eurostat on mobile students (those who moved solely for study) are much less complete. NL = the Netherlands. Source: Eurostat, 'Foreign students by level of education and country of origin,' http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=educ_mofo_orig&lang=en.

D. Retirement


Mobile EU citizens also move for lifestyle reasons. Chief among these is retirement. Expat communities have sprung up along the Spanish coast following northern Europeans in pursuit of a better quality of life in the sun. Retirement migration is made easier within Europe by low bureaucratic hurdles, low-cost flights, and a lower cost of living in southern Member States. But this dimension of intra-EU mobility is often overlooked, in part because it is difficult to obtain data that paint an accurate picture of pensioners living in other EU countries. Retirement migration is not a singular phenomenon; some retirees move back and forth seasonally, others move permanently. This means that not all retirees formally register in their new country.³⁹ While countries do provide data on resident EU nationals who are over 65, they do not differentiate between those who moved after retirement and those who moved for another reason and stayed and individuals retire at different times.

Mobile EU citizens also move for lifestyle reasons. Chief among these is retirement.

Data on individuals over 65 are therefore likely both to overestimate (as some of the population will have lived in the country prior to retirement) and underestimate (because many are under 65 or choose not to register as residents) the magnitude of migration for retirement. These caveats aside, the steep increase in individuals over 65 from other Member States resident in Spain provides some sense of the burgeoning phenomenon of retirement mobility (see Figure 12).

39 Irene Hardill, Jacqui Spradbery, Judy Arnold-Boakes, and Maria Luisa Marrugat, 'Severe Health and Social Care Issues among British Migrants Who Retire to Spain,' *Ageing & Society* 25, no. 5 (2005): 769–83.

Figure 12. Mobile EU Citizens Over 65 Resident in Spain, 1999-2011



Note: Data are not available for 2005 and 2006.
 Source: Eurostat, 'Population by sex, age group and citizenship.'

IV. IMPACT

A. Impact on the Labour Market

1. Receiving Countries

Immigration can have both positive and negative economic impacts on receiving countries. Immigrants contribute to public finances, support the development of new industries, and create new jobs. But they can also compete for jobs with local workers and bring earnings down if they work for a lower wage. While immigration might have a positive impact at a national level, it might affect some groups negatively ('distributional effects'). Finally, immigration might have a worse impact under less favourable economic conditions: a boom might spur the creation of new jobs, while a weak economy often prompts more competition for existing jobs.⁴⁰

Immigration can have both positive and negative economic impacts on receiving countries.

In general, studies of the economic impact of immigration in general conclude that while it has a positive impact on the public finances, it decreases wages and the employment prospects for certain groups, in particular the low skilled.⁴¹ Intra-EU mobility might be thought to have a greater negative impact, because governments are unable to control the skill level of inflows into a particular area, which means there is a greater risk of an influx of workers competing for low-skilled jobs. The few studies that disaggregate intra-EU mobility from immigration more broadly find no evidence that this has occurred.⁴² For example, a study containing one of the most negative findings

40 Giovanni Peri, *The Impact of Immigration in Recession and Economic Expansion* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2010), www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Peri-June2010.pdf.

41 The gravity of the impact varies by study. Migration Policy Institute (MPI) calculations of the findings of Christian Dustmann, Albrecht Glitz, and Tommaso Frattini, 'The Labour Market Impact of Immigration' (working paper 0811 Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, Department of Economics, University College London, Autumn 2008), www.cream-migration.org/publications/CDP_11_08.pdf conclude that a 200,000 increase in immigration was associated with a loss of earnings for local workers of £20 a year. Another study finds potential losses of £300 to £500 in certain occupations; see Stephen Nickel and Jumana Saleheen, 'The Impact of Immigration on Occupational Wages: Evidence from Britain' (working paper 0034, Spatial Economics Research Centre, London School of Economics, 2009), www.spatial-economics.ac.uk/textonly/SERC/publications/download/sercdp0034.pdf.


42 In fact, several UK studies suggest that EU migration may be able to avoid these distributional effects. See, for example, Nicola Gilpin, Matthew Henty, Sara Lemos, Jonathan Portes, and Chris Bullen, 'The Impact of Free Movement of Workers from Central and Eastern

(that every additional 100 workers entering the United Kingdom are associated with an increase in unemployment for 23 local workers) concludes that EU migration has no such effect.⁴³ But it may be that the sample size when EU citizens are disaggregated is too small to find an impact. Moreover, the United Kingdom is in many ways a special case, because post-enlargement migration was geographically dispersed (rather than concentrated in urban areas), because workers were well educated (relative to the work they were doing), and because many returned home when work dried up.

Outside the United Kingdom, the evidence is more mixed. In Ireland, while unemployment and vacancy rates remained largely unchanged in the years after the 2004 enlargement, some sectors saw a decline in Irish workers alongside an increase in migrant workers.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, in Italy, EU migration is thought to have had a modest but positive effect on wages and unemployment, but a negative impact on the economic prospects of existing migrants.⁴⁵ One comprehensive, comparative study of the impact of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements across the entire region found that in the short term, less-skilled and foreign workers were negatively affected by competition from nationals from new Member States.⁴⁶

Quantifying the macroeconomic impacts is even more difficult, in part because of the absence of a counterfactual. The potential for intra-EU mobility to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis has come under increased scrutiny in recent years. For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) suggests that the unemployment rates of mobile EU citizens have risen more slowly than those of natives because of migrants' ability to respond more quickly to labour market fluctuations.⁴⁷ And the Deutsche Bank calculates that if immigration and emigration levels had remained at 2006 and 2007 levels in 2008 and 2009, Ireland would have had 89,200 additional people of working age and Spain would have had an additional 498,000. Assuming no additional jobs were created, these extra workers would have bumped unemployment up by 3.5 percent in Ireland and 1.7 percent in Spain.⁴⁸

Figure 13. Irish Unemployment Rate by Nationality, 2008 and 2012



Source: Central Statistics Office, 'Quarterly National Household Survey' (QNHS), www.cso.ie/en/qnhs/.

But crisis-hit countries have experienced spiraling unemployment despite the outlet of intra-EU mobility. While unemployment rose more slowly for intra-EU migrants as a whole, on both a country and group level there are few signs that free movement has alleviated unemployment. In Ireland, for example, EU-12 nationals saw their unemployment rise by 12 percent between 2008 and 2012 (see Figure 13).

Europe on the UK Labour Market' (working paper 29, Department for Work and Pensions, 2006), <http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/WP29.pdf>.

43 Migration Advisory Committee, *Analysis of the Impacts of Migration* (London: Migration Advisory Committee, UK Border Agency, 2012), www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/workingwithus/mac/27-analysis-migration/01-analysis-report/analysis-of-the-impacts?view=Binary.

44 Nicola Doyle, Gerard Hughes, and Eskil Wadesnsjö, *Freedom of Movement for Workers from Central and Eastern Europe: Experiences in Ireland and Sweden* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2006), www.sieps.se/en/publikationer/freedom-of-movement-for-workers-from-central-and-eastern-europe-20065. See also Nicola Doyle, 'The Effects of Central European Labour Migration on Ireland,' in *Labor Mobility in the European Union: New Members, New Challenges*, ed. Jen Smith-Bozek (Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis, 2007).

45 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Free Movement of Workers and Labour Market Adjustment: Recent Experiences from OECD Countries and the European Union* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264177185-en>.

46 Herbert Brücker et al., *Labour Mobility within the EU in the Context of Enlargement and the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements* (Brussels: DG Employment, 2009), <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2509&langId=en>.

47 OECD, *Free Movement of Workers and Labour Market Adjustment*. The OECD also suggests evidence of the 'added worker effect,' or employers preferring EU workers because of their high productivity.

48 DB Research, *Labour Mobility in the Euro Area*.

3. Sending Countries

Sending countries may suffer by losing a part of their working-age population—a possibility that has come under increased scrutiny. But analysts disagree as to whether emigration is positive or negative for the central and eastern European regions overall. Mass emigration has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, remittances can bring extra capital into the country, and outflows can alleviate unemployment through the removal of labour surpluses. On the other hand, the loss of more-skilled workers (‘brain drain’) or shortages caused by large worker outflows from certain sectors can stunt the economy. Following the 2004 enlargement, certain sectors in central and eastern Europe are thought to have experienced acute labour shortages, particularly in construction, textiles, catering, and hospitality.⁴⁹ These costs are more problematic if they are not offset by efforts to train workers who may otherwise be marginalised—or by the benefits of return migration (i.e., ‘brain circulation,’ when workers return home with new skills acquired abroad).

The evidence is mixed as to whether large-scale emigration has been a good or bad thing for central and eastern Europe.

It might be thought that the flexibility of intra-EU migration and the relatively short geographical distances involved lend themselves to circular migration and a subsequent exchange of human capital. But many EU-8 nationals abroad are overqualified for the work they are performing, thus limiting their opportunities and making it more likely that the investments that the sending societies made in training them go wasted.⁵⁰ One study, based on surveys of returned Latvian migrants, finds that they are faring worse in the job market relative to other groups.⁵¹

The evidence is mixed as to whether large-scale emigration has been a good or bad thing for central and eastern Europe. Over the past decade, EU-8 countries have seen conditions in their labour markets converge with those in western European countries. However, it is doubtful whether emigration itself was responsible for reducing unemployment. The increase in numbers who entered employment in the sending countries was far greater than the number of individuals who emigrated, suggesting that there were other factors at play in creating additional jobs.⁵² At the same time, it is also unclear whether labour shortages were bad for eastern European countries on the whole. Shortages in certain sectors drove up wages, while the jobs most affected were in general not highly skilled, so training new workers was not especially costly.⁵³ In recent years, the new Member States have also begun to experience higher inflows of immigrants, which may enable countries to replace lost workers. How these trends will play out over time remains to be seen.

B. Impact on Public Services

As both consumers of and contributors to public services and amenities, migrants can either benefit or burden their host societies, depending on whether their consumption outweighs their contribution. Greater use of public services is associated with characteristics like age and family size, while contributions rise as individuals earn more. Hence young, employed labour migrants without families are likely to be low consumers of services.⁵⁴ Theoretically, the fact that EU migrants are required to be economically active or self-supporting should make them low consumers of public services. While under transitional arrangements, countries were able to restrict access to certain services and benefits to those who had paid into the system, there is now no requirement to have been employed in the country—EU citizens have access to benefits and services if they are looking for work.⁵⁵

49 Brückner et al., *Labour Mobility within the EU*.

50 Watt, Galgóczi, and Leschke, ‘Intra-EU Labour Migration.’ A study reported in OECD, *Free Movement of Workers and Labour Market Adjustment*, found that returns to education among well-educated Poles emigrating to the United Kingdom was lower than if they had stayed at home.

51 Reported in OECD, *Free Movement of Workers and Labour Market Adjustment*.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Anita George, Pamela Meadows, Hilary Metcalf, and Heather Rolfe, *Impact of Migration on Consumption of Education and Children’s Services and the Consumption of Health Services, Social Care and Social Services* (London: National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 2011), www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/workingwithus/mac/27-analysis-migration/02-research-projects/impact-of-migration?view=Binary.

55 EU citizens (and their families) have the right to reside in another Member State if they are workers, self-employed, jobseekers

In general, the temporary and circular nature of EU movements is thought to encourage low use of public services. In the United Kingdom (which has the largest evidence base on this question), studies have found that EU-8 migrants who have resided in the country long enough to become eligible for benefits are net contributors to the public purse and low users of public services.⁵⁶ Evidence also points to a parsimonious use of health care among EU citizens, in part because many of them are young, single, and move frequently.⁵⁷ But the limited contact that highly mobile EU-12 workers have with the health system can be a double-edged sword, as it makes them more likely to visit emergency rooms for medical support because they have not registered with a doctor.⁵⁸ While language difficulties and limited knowledge of what services are available makes migrant workers low consumers overall, in practice this can mean congestion in certain services.⁵⁹ Studies that measure the impact of these groups on public services overall may be insufficiently sensitive to these important distributional effects.

*In general, the temporary and circular nature of EU movements
is thought to encourage low use of public services.*

The consumption of health care by retirement migrants in certain regions of southern Europe has raised a different set of problems. Pensioners are high users of health care, which may exacerbate the pressures on certain regions experiencing an ageing population alongside an exodus of young workers.⁶⁰ The geographic concentration of retirement communities is thought to cause further congestion, particularly if health-care subsidies provided by sending governments are not distributed by national governments to municipalities on a per capita basis. Additionally, the common practice of not registering as a permanent resident (in order to retain access to benefits in the home country), as well as the fact that some pensioners are seasonal visitors, can make it difficult for local authorities to access the amount of funding appropriate to their population.⁶¹ Despite these concerns, governments continue to court mobile retirees, because of the injection of foreign capital they bring into the region.⁶²

The cyclical nature of retirement mobility can also result in additional costs for the sending countries of northern Europe. For example some retirees maintain a nominal address in the home country in order to be able to return home for health care. In fact, the practice of making fraudulent claims for benefits in the sending country is so common that it has been given a name: ‘grey abuse.’ In the United Kingdom, fraudulent claims for pension credits are thought to exceed the cost of fraud committed by people working while claiming unemployment benefits.⁶³

C. Impact on Communities

Unexpected and sudden migration flows can have an impact on local communities, especially those unaccustomed to receiving immigrants.⁶⁴ This can lead to problems of planning and funding, where local authorities have been allocated a budget on the basis of population figures that have rapidly changed; problems of congestion, where sheer volume exceeds capacity; and problems of absorption, where certain areas lack the infrastructure to provide mi-

with a genuine chance of getting work, students with sufficient resources for themselves and their family, or self-supporting. If they become an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the social security system, they can be repatriated, but this is generally seen as a last resort.

56 Christian Dustmann, Tommaso Frattini and Caroline Halls, ‘Assessing the Fiscal Costs and Benefits of A8 Migration to the UK,’ (Discussion Paper Series CDP No 18/09, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, University College London, July 2009), www.cream-migration.org/publ/uploads/CDP_18_09.pdf.

57 For an overview of the evidence, see George et al., *Impact of Migration on Consumption of Education and Children’s Services*.

58 Adam Steventon and Martin Bardsley, ‘Use of Secondary Care in England by International Immigrants,’ *Journal of Health Services Research and Policy* 16 (2011): 90–4.

59 George et al., *Impact of Migration on Consumption of Education and Children’s Services*.

60 Keleigh Coldron and Louise Ackers, ‘(Ab)Using European Citizenship? EU Retired Migrants and the Exercise of Healthcare Rights,’ *Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law* 3: 287–302, and M. Garcia and M. Sanchez Bale, ‘Speaker’s Corner — The Right to Health of the European Union Citizens: A Strategy for a Social European Construction,’ *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health* 57 (2003): 564.

61 Hardill et al., ‘Severe Health and Social Care Issues,’ and Karen O’Reilly, *The Extent and Nature of Integration of European Migrants in Spanish Society* (London: Economic and Social Research Council, 2004).

62 Coldron and Ackers, ‘(Ab)Using European Citizenship?’

63 In 2006 the Department of Work and Pensions estimated that £23 million was lost in this way between 2004 and 2005—6 million more than caused by those working while claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (a form of unemployment benefit), as reported in Coldron and Ackers, ‘(Ab)Using European Citizenship?’ Also see this paper for a discussion of the prevalence of these types of fraudulent and semi-fraudulent behavior, based on qualitative interviews in the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden.

64 Sumption and Somerville, *The UK’s New Europeans*.

grants with the tools for integration.

The impact of intra-EU migration on local communities is almost impossible to assess because areas that receive high volumes of EU migrants often receive high volumes of third-country migrants as well.⁶⁵ That said there is some evidence on two indicators that may be illustrative: crime and homelessness. Intra-EU migrants are thought to be associated with less crime than other immigrants, but the evidence on this is limited. One comprehensive attempt in the United Kingdom to disaggregate the impact of different forms of migration found that theft and burglary rates fell faster in areas with larger inflows of migrants from EU-12 countries.⁶⁶ Elsewhere, studies have found that immigrant-heavy areas tend to have higher property crime, but do not differentiate between the impact of illegal immigration, third-country immigration, and EU immigration.⁶⁷

*Unexpected and sudden migration flows
 can have an impact on local communities*

Numerous studies find that immigrants, new arrivals in particular, are overrepresented in homeless groups.⁶⁸ Migrants are at increased risk of homelessness for various reasons. They are more likely to be in precarious employment and more likely to have been housed by their employer (making losing work a gateway to potential homelessness), and they know less about where to access support.⁶⁹ Moreover, homeless groups do not lend themselves to easy data collection, so it is difficult to determine how widespread the problem of EU migrant homelessness is. One study reports that EU-12 nationals are at higher risk of homelessness than other groups in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, but that elsewhere support systems function effectively for these groups.⁷⁰

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A field of research on intra-EU mobility emerged in the years following EU enlargement. Most of this research addressed the specific question of flows from new Member States and their impact on receiving countries, and in particular, the United Kingdom.

But examining the magnitude and impacts of intra-EU mobility is about much more than east-to-west labour migration. The large post-enlargement flows have showed signs of dissipating in recent years. At the same time, emigration from the countries of southern Europe worst-hit by the crisis is on the increase, and many (although a minority) of these migrants are headed to northern Europe. Moreover, migration for non-work reasons (including family, study, or retirement) is also a growing phenomenon.

Rigorous evidence on the impact of intra-EU mobility is relatively scant. Most research on the impact of immigration addresses the impact of third-country nationals, in part because non-EU migration policy is seen as more likely to change and thus a more appropriate subject of scrutiny and debate.⁷¹ What evidence exists suggests intra-EU

65 Migration Advisory Committee, *Analysis of the Impacts of Migration*.

66 Brian Bell and Stephen Machin, *The Impact of Migration on Crime and Victimisation* (London: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, 2011), www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/workingwithus/mac/27-analysis-migration/02-research-projects/lse-consulting?view=Binary.

67 Milo Bianchi, Paolo Buonanno, and Paolo Pinotti, 'Do Immigrants Cause Crime?' (working paper no. 2008-05, Paris School of Economics, 2008), <http://aisberg.unibg.it/bitstream/10446/288/1/WPEco01%282008%29Bianchi.pdf>.

68 Findings include that a majority of people sleeping on the street in major Spanish cities are foreigners, and that having recently arrived is the factor most associated with homelessness in France. For an overview of the evidence, see Mark Stephens, Suzanne Fitzpatrick, Marja Elsinga, Guido van Steen, and Yekaterina Chzhen, *Study on Housing Exclusion: Welfare Policies, Housing Provision and Labour Markets* (Brussels: DG Employment, 2010), www.sbe.hw.ac.uk/documents/Fitzpatrick_et_al_2010_Study_on_Housing_Exclusion_Welfare_policies_Labour_Market_and_Housing_Provision.pdf.

69 A related problem is that EU nationals appear more likely to live in unsafe or overcrowded accommodations than other groups of migrants. See Audit Commission, *Crossing Borders: Responding to the Local Challenges of Migrant Workers* (London: Audit Commission, 2008), <http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/6380/1/CrossingBorders.pdf>.

70 In certain boroughs of London, a large proportion of homeless people, street drinkers, and users of night shelters are reportedly EU-12 nationals. See Audit Commission, *Crossing Borders*.

71 For example Migration Advisory Committee, *Analysis of the Impacts of Migration*, separates out the impact of EU and non-EU migrants in terms of labour market impact, but focuses only on non-EEA migrants for its qualitative analysis of social impact. Similarly, a report by a UK parliament committee concludes that because EU migration cannot be controlled, only non-EU migration

mobility has had a positive impact on Europe *overall*, but that these effects have not been distributed evenly across receiving countries and regions.

Even less is known about the social impact of intra-EU mobility, in part because it is difficult to separate out its effects from that of immigration more broadly. Finally, while EU migrants appear to be low consumers of public services and amenities, some groups may place burdens on certain groups and communities.

Looking toward the future, it is very difficult to tell how intra-EU mobility will evolve. Projections are notoriously unreliable, as the UK government found when it based its estimates for post-enlargement migration on existing flows from Eastern Europe. That said, a few points merit observation. Since Eastern Europe is experiencing more rapid population ageing than other EU countries, it is unlikely that it will provide a ceaseless flow of labour into low-wage jobs, especially as economic prospects improve at home. At the same time, there is no reason to think that the circulation of highly skilled workers will not continue. And a new round of enlargements is also on the horizon, with the addition of Croatia in 2013, the remaining countries of the former Yugoslavia, and possibly Turkey.

*Looking toward the future,
it is very difficult to tell how intra-EU mobility will evolve.*

Several avenues for future research emerge from this review. First, the uneven impacts on certain regions and communities are not yet clear. In particular, the impact of rapidly changing demographics of seasonal or temporary residents on how local authorities access and distribute funding merits further study. Second, there is little research about how migrants themselves fare under intra-EU mobility. Because ‘integration’ is seen as an inappropriate policy objective for groups who may only be temporary residents, the field of third-country national integration attracts much more attention from researchers and policymakers.⁷² Third, most of the received wisdom on intra-EU mobility derives from the pre-crisis period. A central question now is whether the crisis has inspired people to become more mobile, and if so, whether national and EU governments are prepared to support and stimulate this movement in a way that benefits all Europeans.

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is an open question and therefore worthy of study; Select Committee on Economic Affairs, *The Economic Impact of Immigration* (London: House of Commons, 2008), www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeconaf/82/82.pdf.

72 Elizabeth Collett, *The Integration Need of Mobile EU Citizens: Impediments and Opportunities* (Brussels: MPI Europe, 2012).

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS



Meghan Benton is a Policy Analyst at the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) and a Fellow at MPI Europe. Her research interests include citizenship policy, immigrant integration, and asylum and refugee issues.

Before joining MPI, Dr. Benton was a Research Associate at University College London's Constitution Unit, where she published several reports on the UK Parliament, parliamentary committees, and the legislative process. Her most recent publications include *Selective Influence: The Policy Impact of House of Commons Select Committees* and 'The Tyranny of the Enfranchised Majority? The Accountability of States to their Non-Citizen Population,' which was published in the journal *Res Publica* and shortlisted for its postgraduate prize. She also authored a number of papers and reports on education and young people while working for the Institute for Public Policy Research in London.

Dr. Benton received her PhD in political science from University College London in 2010. Her dissertation focused on the rights of resident noncitizens and citizenship acquisition. She also holds a master's degree in legal and political theory (with distinction) from University College London, and a bachelor's degree in philosophy and literature from Warwick University.



Milica Petrovic is a Research Assistant at MPI Europe, where she works in the International Program, particularly in the fields of integration, education, and employment.

Before joining MPI Europe, Ms. Petrovic was a Research Assistant at GHK Consulting, where she assisted in organizing the work of the European Migration Network (EMN). Prior to this, she was a trainee at the European Commission, in the Unit for Immigration and Integration at the Directorate-General for Home Affairs.

Ms. Petrovic earned her MSc in European studies with a focus on migration from the London School of Economics and Political Science. She received her BA in French and English languages and literature, and MA in comparative literature from Ghent University. Ms. Petrovic also studied at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne.



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www.MPIEurope.org

Residence Palace
155 Rue de la Loi
5th Floor
1040 Brussels
Belgium

Phone: +32 (2) 235 2113